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Abstract—Cloud-supported Internet of Things (Cloud-IoT)
has been broadly deployed in smart grid systems. The IoT
front-ends are responsible for data acquisition and status
supervision, while the substantial amount of data is stored and
managed in the cloud server. Achieving data security and system
efficiency in the data acquisition and transmission process are of
great significance and challenging, because the power
grid-related data is sensitive and in huge amount. In this paper,
we present an efficient and secure data acquisition scheme based
on CP-ABE (Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption).
Data acquired from the terminals will be partitioned into blocks
and encrypted with its corresponding access sub-tree in sequence,
thereby the data encryption and data transmission can be
processed in parallel. Furthermore, we protect the information
about the access tree with threshold secret sharing method,
which can preserve the data privacy and integrity from users
with the unauthorized sets of attributes. The formal analysis
demonstrates that the proposed scheme can fulfill the security
requirements of the Cloud-supported IoT in smart grid. The
numerical analysis and experimental results indicate that our
scheme can effectively reduce the time cost compared with other
popular approaches.
Index Terms—Cloud-supported IoT, smart grid, CP-ABE,
data acquisition, parallel.
I. INTRODUCTION
ith the support of modern information technologies like
the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing, smart
grid has emerged as the next-generation power supply network,
in which the electricity is generated according to the real-time
demands of electric equipment or household appliances [1,2].
To make the smart grid more intelligent, a great number of IoT
terminals are deployed to gather the status of the power grid
timely for the control center. Some sample applications are
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shown in Fig. 1, such as the power transmission line
monitoring, power generation monitoring, substation state
monitoring, smart metering, electric energy data acquisition,
smart home. For instance, in power transmission line
monitoring scenario, using preplaced sensors, the status
parameters of the transmission line and power towers can be
gathered in real time, so that any fault can be diagnosed and
located in a timely manner.
In smart grid, the different kinds of applications mentioned
above all generate an enormous amount of data, which needs
to be stored and managed efficiently. Cloud-IoT is proposed to
address this issue [2,3]. As shown in Fig. 1, with the support of
cloud computing, mass data from different IoT terminals can
be collected and processed by local front-end servers, then
transferred and stored in the cloud servers. The data in cloud
can be accessed by various types of data users. The power grid
staff can continually monitor the status of power grid.
Researchers and government agencies can analyze the data for
research or policymaking.
Fig. 1 Illustration of cloud-supported IoT in smart grid
Actually, some works on Wireless Sensor Networks can be
used for reference, such as [4-9]. However, there are still
several problems and challenges in smart grid data acquisition.
First, the efficiency of data acquisition should be considered
due to the large amount of data to be encrypted/decrypted and
transferred. It’s critical to ensure an acceptable the data
acquisition time. Second, the protection of data security and
privacy must be kept in mind. To deal with these two problems
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2simultaneously, in this paper, we present an efficient and
secure data acquisition scheme based on CP-ABE. The main
contributions of our work can be summarized as the following:
We propose a parallel data processing method. Data
acquired from the terminals will be partitioned into
blocks and encrypted with its corresponding access
sub-tree in sequence, thereby the data encryption and
data transmission can be processed in parallel. The
data decryption process is similar to the process of data
encryption.
We introduce the dual secret sharing scheme to protect
the access tree information. Only when all of the
shares are combined can the secret be recovered. Each
of the data blocks holds a share. While the last one
share is protected with the other secret sharing scheme.
If the user’s attributes satisfy the threshold function of
root node, then the last share will be retrieved. In
addition, some users with the unauthorized attributes
sets will be filtered out. We realize the
privacy-preserving, the data integrity check and the
attributes check simultaneously.
We give the security analysis and performance evaluation,
which prove that the security of our scheme is no
weaker than that of the traditional scheme, and that our
scheme can reduce the system response time and
users’ waiting time notably.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the related work. The preliminaries are given in
section 3. In section 4, the system model and security model
are described. In section 5, we present the details of the
proposed scheme. Its security analysis and performance
evaluation are conducted in section 6 and section 7,
respectively. Section 8 concludes the paper.
II.RELATED WORK
Recently, various techniques have been proposed to address
the problems of data security and fine-grained access control.
In [10], Sahai and Waters proposed the Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) to realize fine-grained access control on
encrypted data. In ABE, the encryption policy is associated
with a set of attributes, and the data owner can be offline after
data is encrypted. Vipul Goyal et al developed a new
cryptosystem for fine-grained sharing of encrypted data in [11]
based on Sahai’s work, called Key-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (KP-ABE). In their scheme, the ciphertext’s
encryption policy is associated with a set of attributes, but the
attributes that organized into a tree structure (named access
tree) are specified by data receivers. In [12], Bethencourt et al
proposed the Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
(CP-ABE). In their work, the data owner constructs the access
tree using visitors’ identity information. The user can decrypt
the ciphertext only if the attributes in his private key match the
access tree.
Owing to the particular advantages of ABE, they are often
applied to protect the outsourced data. Yu et al tried to achieve
secure, scalable, and fine-grained access control in a cloud
environment [13]. Their proposed scheme was based on
KP-ABE, and combined with another two techniques, proxy
re-encryption and lazy re-encryption. It was proved that the
proposed scheme can meet the security requirements quite
well in cloud. Similarly, [14-16] are other applications of
KP-ABE in cloud. Han et al [16] defined a weak anonymity of
ABE scheme and proposed a general transformation from
ABE to Attribute Based Encryption with Keyword Search.
In [17], the researchers proposed the first KP-ABE scheme
enabling truly expressive access structures with constant
ciphertext size. In [18], Li et al proposed an expressive
decentralizing KP-ABE scheme with constant ciphertext size,
which allows the access policy to be expressed as any
non-monotone access structure. Similarly, in [19], a fully
secure scheme in the standard model is proposed, which is
with constant-size ciphertexts and fast decryption
simultaneously. There are some other similar researches, such
as [20]. The comparison of the above schemes is showed in
Table I.
TABLE I. THE COMPARISON OF SCHEMES
To improve system efficiency and protect the user privacy,
some researchers study on the multiple authorities. Fu et al [21]
firstly presented the Attribute-based Encryption (ABE), secure
deletion and secret-sharing schemes and construed a secure
multi-authority access control scheme. The scheme proposed
in [22] could reduce the reliance on the central authority and
protect users’ privacy. The proposed scheme allows each
authority to work independently without any collaboration to
initialize the system and issue secret keys to users. In [23], Li
et al presented a low complexity multi-authority attribute
based encryption scheme for mobile cloud computing, which
uses masked shared-decryption-keys to ensure the security of
decryption outsourcing. They adopted multi-authorities for
authorization, to enhance the security assurance.
How to ensure the integrity and correctness of data are
challenging issues. In [24], Yadav and Dave presented an
Constant
ciphertext
size
Access
Structure
KP-ABE/
CP-ABE
Security
[17] √ Non-monotonic KP-ABE CCA-secure
[18] √ Non-monotonic KP-ABE Semantic secure
[19] √ Monotonic KP-ABE
Fully secure in
Standard oracle
[20] √ Monotonic CP-ABE CCA-secure
3access model based on CP-ABE which could provide a remote
integrity check by way of augmenting secure data storage
operations. Zhou adopted a similar method [25]. In addition to
the access tree division, Zhou also proposed an efficient data
management model to balance the communication and storage
overhead and reduce the cost of data management operations.
Lai et al [26] gave the formal model of ABE with verifiable
outsourced decryption and propose a concrete scheme. Lin et
al [27] proposed a generic construction of verifiable
outsourced ABE (VO-ABE), based on an attribute-based key
encapsulation mechanism (AB-KEM). It can be considered in
both key-policy (KP) and ciphertext-policy (CP) settings. Mao
et al [28] proposed generic constructions of CPA-secure and
RCCA-secure ABE systems with verifiable outsourced
decryption from CPA-secure ABE with outsourced decryption,
respectively.
In [29], M Green et al proposed a proxy re-encryption in
Identity-Based Encryption scheme, in which the ciphertexts
can be transformed from one identity to another. In [30], R
Canetti et al proposed a definition of security against chosen
ciphertext attacks for PRE schemes. An IBE PRE scheme was
proposed in [31] without random oracles. In [32], the first
unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme was proposed with
chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. In [33], SSM
Chow et al’s scheme gains high efficiency and CCA security
using the “token-controlled encryption” technique. H Wang et
al realized an identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme that
can achieve IND-CCA2 secure [34]. In contrast with requiring
users to be online all the time, a time-based proxy
re-encryption (Time-PRE) scheme was presented in [35] to
revoke a user’s access right automatically after a
predetermined period of time. In [36], the proxy re-encryption
was proved to be useful as a method of adding access control
to the SFS read-only file system. This scheme also achieves a
stronger notion of security.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Bilinear Maps
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p and g be the generator of G0. The bilinear map e
is, 0 0 1:e G G G  , for all , pa bZ :
 Bilinearity： 1, , ( , ) ( , )
a b abu v G e u v e u v   .
 Non-degeneracy： ( , ) 1e g g  .
 Symmetric： ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a b ab b ae g g e g g e g g  .
B. Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem:
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p and g
be its generator. Given a tuple , xg g  , where Rg G and
PxZ are chosen as input uniformly at random, the DL
problem is to recover x.
Definition 1 The DL assumption holds in G is that no
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm  can solve the
DL problem with negligible advantage. We define the
advantage of as follows:
Pr[ , ]xg g x 
The probability is over the generator g, randomly chosen x
and the random bits consumed by .
C. Structure in Ciphertext-policy Attribute Based Encryption
(CP-ABE)
Definition 2 Let 1 2{ , ,..., }nP P P P be a set of participants,
let 1 2{ , ,..., }2 nP P PU  be the universal set. If  \AS U   , then
AS can be viewed as an access structure. If
, ,A AS B U A B    , and B AS , AS is considered as a
monotonic access structure. Then the sets in AS are defined as
authorized sets, while the other sets are regarded as
unauthorized sets.
To achieve fine-grained access control, we utilize the
Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme. For
ease of partition, we adopt the Bethencourt’s scheme in [12], in
which the access structure is illustrated by an access tree.
Let be an access tree, and the root node is denoted by .
All the leaves represent the attributes, while the interior nodes
represent the threshold gates, described by its children and a
threshold value, such as AND (n of n), OR (1of n), and n of m
(m>n).
At the beginning of the encryption, we randomly choose a
secret s and conduct a polynomial for each node from top to
bottom, while the decryption order is reverse.
Additionally, some functions are necessary to be introduced.
We use parent(x) to get the parent of the node x. The function
att(x) is used only if x is a leaf node and returns the attribute
associated with the leaf node x in the tree. The function
index(x) returns the number associated with the node x, where
the index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the tree.
To retrieve the secret, we define the Lagrange
coefficient ,i S as follows:
For pi¢ , and for x S  ,
, ( ) ,i S x j S j i
x j
i j 
   .
D. (t, n) Threshold Secret Sharing
Secret sharing scheme is used for sharing a secret among a
group of parties, each of whom only obtain a piece of the
secret (namely a share of the secret). No single party can infer
any information about the secret with its own share. The only
4way to reconstruct the secret is to combine a certain number of
shares.
The most basic secret sharing scheme is (t, n) threshold
scheme, which was first proposed by Shamir [37]. In his
scheme, a secret divided into n parts can be recovered only if at
least t parts are collected. This idea has already been used to
implement the tree-access structure.
IV. DEFINITIONS
A.Definition of System Model
Our system consists of four entities, namely Data Owner,
Cloud Server, Attribute Authority, and Data
Requester/Receiver. Both Data Owners (denoted as DO) and
Data Requester/Receivers (denoted as DR) are users.
Data Owners (DO) DO decide the access policy and
encrypt the data with CP-ABE. The encrypted data will be
uploaded to the Cloud Servers. DO are assumed to be honest
in the system.
Data Requester/Receivers (DR) DR send the decryption
request to Cloud and obtain the ciphertexts over the internet.
Only when their attributes satisfy the access policies of the
ciphertext, can they get access to the plaintexts. Data
requester/receivers may collude to access the data that is
otherwise not accessible individually.
Cloud Servers (CS) CS are responsible for storing a
massive volume of data. They cannot be trusted by DO. Hence,
it is necessary for DO to define the access policy to ensure the
data confidentiality. CS are assumed not to collude with DR.
Attribute Authority (AA) AA is responsible for
registering users, evaluating their attributes and generating
their secret key SK accordingly. It runs the Setup algorithm,
and issues public key PK and master key MK to each DO. It is
considered as fully trusted.
B.Definition of Our system
Definition 3 Our scheme consists of the following
algorithms: Setup, Key_Gen, Encryption, and Decryption.
Setup (1 ) → PK, MK. The setup algorithm takes a security
parameter  as input and outputs the public key and master
key.
Key_Gen (PK, MK, S) → SK. The key generation algorithm
takes the public key PK, the master key MK and a set S of
attributes that belongs to users as inputs. It outputs a
corresponding secret key SK.
Encryption (PK, M, AS) → CTB. The encryption algorithm
consists of two subroutines: data partition subroutine
Data_Partition and data block encryption subroutine
DB_Encryption.
 Data_Partition (M, AS) →DB1…DBn. This subroutine
takes the message M and access structure AS as inputs. It
outputs a number of encrypted data blocks DBs. The
number is decided by the threshold function.
 DB_Encryption (DBi, ASi, PK, MK) → CTBi. The data
block encryption subroutine takes the data blocks DBs,
the corresponding sub-access-structure ASi, public key
PK and master key MK as inputs. It outputs the ciphertext
blocks CTBs.
Decryption (DBi, ASi, PK, SK) → DBi. The data decryption
algorithm consists of six subroutines: check of user’s attributes
subroutine ATT_Check, check of the ciphertext blocks
integrity subroutine CTB_Integrity, the leaf nodes decryption
subroutine Decrypt_LeafNode, the interior nodes decryption
subroutine Decrypt_InteriorNode, two ciphertext block
decryption subroutines CTB_ABE_Dec and
CTB_SYM_Dec.
 ATT_Check (CTBn, S) → Rn+1 or  . This subroutine
takes as inputs the last ciphertext block CTBn and user’s
attributes set S. If the check is passed, it returns Rn+1.
Otherwise, it outputs .
 CTB_Integrity (CTB.id, Rn+1) →  or  . This
subroutine takes as inputs all the id of ciphertext blocks
and the output of ATT_Check. If the check is passed, it
outputs the access tree information  . Otherwise, it
outputs .
 Decrypt_LeafNode (CTBi , SK, z, ) → Fz or⊥ . This
subroutine takes as inputs ciphertext blocks, user’s secret
key, leaf nodes information and the access tree . It
outputs Fz or⊥.
 Decrypt_InteriorNode (Fz , Si, ) → Fi or ⊥ . This
subroutine takes as inputs the outputs of
Decrypt_LeafNode, the leaf nodes set Si and the access
tree . If Si satisfies the current sub-access-policy, it
outputs Fi. Otherwise, it outputs⊥.
 CTB_ABE_Dec (CTBi, SK, Fi) → DBi or  . This
subroutine takes as inputs CTBi, user’s SK, and the output
of Decrypt_InteriorNode. It outputs DBi or .
 CTB_SYM_Dec (CTBi, Ej, SK) → DBi or  . This
subroutine takes as inputs the CTBi, user’s SK and a
parameter Ej. It outputs DBi or .
C.Definition of Security Model
Here, we introduce the universal security model of our
system, which is defined similar to Bethencourt’s scheme in
[12]. In this security model, there is an adversary  and a
challenger . The adversary is allowed to challenge on an
encryption to the access structure AS* and query for any secret
keys SKs as long as they cannot be applied directly to decrypt
5the ciphertext. The challenger is responsible for the ciphertext
generation under the AS* and the secret key generation. Now
the security game is described as follows:
Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the
public parameters PK to the adversary and keeps MK to
itself.
Phase 1: issues queries for repeated private keys
corresponding to the sets of attributes 11,... qS S . (q and q1 are
integers randomly chosen by , with 11 q q  ). If any of
the sets 11,... qS S satisfies the access structure AS*, then aborts.
Else, generates the corresponding secret keys to the sets for
. Then he submits a set of attributes and a ciphertext CT, and
obtains the corresponding M from .
Challenge: submits two equal length messages M0 and
M1 to . The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, and encrypts
Mb under the challenge access structure AS*. Then the
generated ciphertext CT* will be given to .
Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1, and the sets are turned
from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S .
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b
and wins the game if 'b b .
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as
1( ) Pr[ ' ] 2Adv b b   ,
where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the
challenger and the adversary.
Definition 4 A CP-ABE scheme is CCA-secure if
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in the above game.
Definition 5 A CP-ABE scheme is CPA-secure if the
adversaries cannot make decryption queries in Phase 1.
V.DESCRIPTION OF OUR SYSTEM
A.Overview
We partition the file and the access tree into blocks, which
allows each data block to be encrypted and decrypted
independently, in parallel to the transmission and computation
of the different data blocks. This reduces the response time of
severs and shortens the DR’s waiting time.
As soon as a block is encrypted, it is ready to be transmitted,
which allows the next block to be encrypted at the same time.
As shown in Fig.2, we use T1 to denote the total time of
encryption and transmission of our scheme and T2 denote the
time of CP-ABE. The diagram below shows the advantage of
our scheme.
Fig. 2. The encryption-transmission time comparison between our scheme and
CP-ABE
As shown in Fig.3, the similar situation occurs in decryption
phase as well. DR decrypts one block, while others are being
transmitted over the internet. We use T1 to denote the total time
of transmission and decryption of our scheme and T2 denote
the time of CP-ABE. The diagram shows the advantage of our
scheme.
Fig. 3. The transmission-decryption time comparison between our scheme and
CP-ABE
B. Algorithms
Here we will give the details of the algorithms in our
system.
1) Setup
This setup algorithm will choose a bilinear group 0G of
prime order p with generator g. Then, it will choose three
random exponents： , , pq   . The public key and the master
key are published as:
 0 , , , ( , )PK G g h g e g g   (1)
 , ,MK g q (2)
2) Key_Gen
6This operation is implemented by a specific trusted server
independently. It is responsible for registering legal DRs,
evaluating the attributes sets and generating the secret keys
SKs accordingly. The algorithm is as follows:
Key_Gen (PK, MK, S) →SK
This algorithm takes as inputs the set of attributes S, public
parameters PK and master keys MK. A corresponding secret
key is the output. This algorithm first chooses ,j Pr j S  Z
at random for each attribute. The Hash function
0:{0,1}*attH G is introduced to map any attribute described
as a binary string to a random group element. The SK is
computed as:
ˆ, ,
               ( ) , '
r
rq
r rj rj
j att j
D g j S D gSK
D g H j D g


          
(3)
3) Encryption
This process consists of two main algorithms,
Data_Partition and DB_Encryption. The former one is used for
partitioning the original data into several data blocks, the latter
one is responsible for encrypting these data blocks one by one,
which conducts the encryption and transmission in parallel.
Data_Partition (M, n) →DB1… DBn
DO first constructs an access tree for the given access policy
and gets its interior node number n (including the root node).
This algorithm takes as inputs M and n, partitioning as
follows:
1 2 3 1, , ,..., ,n nM M M M M M (4)
1 1
2 1 2
3 2 3
1
,
,
,.
..,
n n n
DB M
DB M M
DB M M
DB M M

 
 
 
(5)
DB_Encryption (DBi, ASi, PK, MK) →CTBi
If i=1, namely that the first block is being encrypted under
the first sub-tree. The sub-tree contains only two levels: the
parent node and its child nodes. The algorithm performs like
following:
It first selects psZ and 1 ps Z at random and computes:
1
1
s
qE g (6)
1
1 1( || ) ( , )
s
sqC DB g e g g  (7)
1  
sC h (8)
According to the threshold of the root node, it will construct
a polynomial ( )Rq x , where (0) ,Rq s which is similar to
Bethencourt’s scheme in [12]. If there is any leaf node
connecting to the root node, let Y1 be the set of leaf nodes, it is
computed as follows:
(0) (0)
1 1, 1,
ˆ ˆ, , ' ( ( ))y yq qy y atty Y C g C H att y    (9)
Where   (0) .y Rq q index y
In addition, if there is any child node y’ being the interior
node of the tree,   ' (0) ' .y Rq q index y It will be the input
for the next sub-tree construction.
Then, a random number R1 generated by a pseudo-random
generator will be considered as the id of CTB1.
1 1.CTB id R (10)
The complete form of the first ciphertext block (CTB1) is as
follows:
 1 1 1 1 1, 1,ˆ ˆ, , , , 'y yCTB C C y Y C C   
If i >1, namely that the first data block has been encrypted
and transmitted over the internet and the other data blocks are
ready for encrypting and transmitting, the encryption process
is similar to that of the first data block. It selects i ps Z at
random and computes:
(0)( || ) ( , )
i
i
s
qq
i iC DB g e g g
 
(0)
1  
iqC h (13)
If there is any leaf node belonging to this sub-tree, let Yi be
the set of leaf nodes, it is computed as follows:
(0) (0)
, ,
ˆ ˆ, , ' ( ( ))y yq qi i y i y atty Y C g C H att y    (14)
The difference is that (0)iq denotes the parent node of the
current sub-tree, where
  ( ), (0) ,
( ), (0) ( ( )).
i j
y i
j parent i q q index i
i parent y q q index y
 
 
To guarantee that each of the CTB can be decrypted, the
algorithm computes a difference value for this data block:
(0)j i
i
s q
sq
iC g g

   (15)
Similarly, set a random number Ri to denote the id of CTBi.
. i iCTB id R (16)
The complete form of the ciphertext block CTBi is as
follows:
 , ,ˆ ˆ, , , , , 'i i i i i i y i yCTB C C C y Y C C    (17)
7If i=n, all the relevant computations about
, ,
ˆ ˆ. , , , , , , 'n n n n n n y n yCTB id C C C y Y C C   is similar to the
previous operation. In addition, the complete information of
the access tree is implicit and protected with (n+1, n+1) secret
sharing scheme by randomly generating Ri and setting
1 1 2 3... .n nR R R R R      (18)
Assume that the threshold function of the root node is k out
of t, then we adopt (k, t) secret sharing scheme to protect Rn+1.
On one hand, the access policy information is implicit. On the
other hand, users with the unauthorized attribute sets will be
eliminated.
As we know, the root node  holds t branches, and each
branch holds several attributes, only when more than k
branches are satisfied can the secret s be recovered. Thus, all
attributes can be divided into t disjoint sets: Set1, Set2,…, Sett.
The algorithm first constructs a polynomial Q(x) whose
degree is k-1 and Q(0)= Rn+1. Then it will select t pairs of
1( , )i i i tx y   and assign them to t attribute sets. We introduce a
one-dimensional array [ ]A x and compute as follows:
If 1iatt Set , set
  1 1( ) ( ) ( || )a i a iA H att H att x y 
If 2jatt Set , set
2 2[ ( )] ( ) ( || )a j a jA H att H att x y 
…
If k tatt Set , set
[ ( )] ( ) ( || )a k a k t tA H att H att x y 
Finally, it outputs:
, ,
ˆ ˆ( , , , , , ', )n n n n n n y n yCTB C C C y Y C C A    (19)
4) Decryption
Once the decryption request is sent, DR’s attributes need to
be checked beforehand.
ATT_Check (CTBn, S) →Rn+1 or 
This algorithm takes as inputs the last ciphertext block and
user’s attribute set. It can filter out some users with
unauthorized sets, which improves the decryption efficiency.
It computes as follows:
, [ ( )] ( ) ||i a i a i j jatt S A H att H att x y    (20)
Finally, it may obtain m pairs of 1( , )j j j mx y   .
With the polynomial interpolation, if m k , the algorithm
can recover the secret and output Rn+1; else, it outputs .
CTB_Integrity (CTB.id, Rn+1) →  or 
Next, the integrity of ciphertext will be checked by DR
before entering the transmission-decryption mode. This
algorithm takes as inputs the id of all the ciphertext blocks and
the output of ATT_Check. It computes as follows:
If all ciphertext blocks are available,
1 2 1
1 2 3 1
. . ... .
...
n n
n n
CTB id CTB id CTB id R
R R R R R


  
    
 
(21)
Else, this algorithm outputs  .
After passing the checks for the attributes and integrity, it
will enter the transmission-decryption mode. This algorithm
takes as inputs the ciphertext block CTB and SK.
As each sub-tree only has two levels, there will be no
recursion algorithm within the calculation. To complete the
computation, we define another two algorithms
Decrypt_LeafNode and Decrypt_InteriorNode.
Decrypt_LeafNode (CTBi , SK, z, )→Fz or⊥
If the node z is a leaf node, then we let j = att(z) and perform
the computation follows:
If j S , then
,
,
(0)
(0)
(0)
ˆ( , )
ˆ( ', ')
( ( ) , )
   
( , ( ( )) )
   ( , )
z
z
z
j i z
z
j i z
qr rj
att
qrj
att
rq
e D C
F
e D C
e g H j g
e g H att z
e g g



(22)
Else, it returns⊥.
All of the leaf nodes contained in this CTBi will be
calculated, and the outputs will be stored.
Decrypt_InteriorNode (Fz , Si, )→Fi or⊥
If the node i is the root node of a sub-tree, for all its child
nodes z, the algorithm Decrypt_LeafNode (CTBi, SK, z, )
will compute them and store the outputs as zF . Let iS be the set
of child nodes z, if ,i zz S F   and the function returns ⊥;
else, we can compute the iF as follows:
 ''( 0)
'(0),
'(0),( )
'(0),
,
. (0)
. ( ( ))
. ( )
(0)
( )
{ ( ) : }
,
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( ( , ) )
     = ( , )
i i
i i
i
n Siz
i
i Sparent z i
i
i Si i
i
i
S
i z
z S
r q
z S
r q index z
z S
r q n
z S
r q
n index z
index z z S
F F where
S
e g g
e g g
e g g
e g g










 



(23)
8To guarantee that all of the CTBs can be decrypted even if
some of the sub-tree cannot be satisfied ，we propose two
decryption methods:
CTB_ABE_Dec (CTBi, SK, Fi) →DBi or 
This subroutine takes as input the result of
Decrypt_InteriorNode. If the result is valid, as long as one of
them is retrieved (assume that the parent node i is retrieved),
this algorithm computes as follows:
(0) (0)
(0)
1
( || ) ( , ) ( , )
( ', )
( , )
             ( ) ||
i
i i
i
i
s
q rqq
i i i
r
i q
s
q
i i
C F DB g e g g e g g
e C D
e h g
M M g






 
(24)
CTB_SYM_Dec (CTBi, Ej, PK, MK) →DBi or 
Once there is one CTB being decrypted by satisfying its
relevant sub-tree, the CTBs that are related to their child nodes
can be decrypted legally.
Set ( )j parent i ,
(0) (0)
(0)
(0)
(0) (0)
(0)
1
ˆ( , ) ( || ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , )
( || ) ( , ) ( , )
               
( , )
               ( ) ||
j
j j i i
i
i
i
i
i
i i
i
i
s
s s q qq
j q q q
s
i
s
q rqq
i i
r
i q
s
q rqq
i
r
q
s
q
i i
E g
E g g
C g
C e E D DB g e g g e E g
e C D
e h g
DB g e g g e g g
e h g
M M g











   


 
(25)
The message M can be retrieved as follows:
1 1
2 2 1
3 3 2
1
,
,
,
...
n n n
M M
M DB M
M DB M
M DB M 

 
 
 

1 2 3|| || ... || nM M M M M 
Finally, it outputs M.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security properties of our system
considering the security model defined in Section 4.
A. System Security
We parallel the transmission and computation by
partitioning the data and access tree into chunks, which
reduces the response time of severs and the DR’s waiting time.
The ways to encrypt and decrypt will affect the security of the
system.
Theorem 1: The security of our system is no weaker than
that of [12].
Proof: We prove this theorem by the following game.
Suppose that an adversary  can attack our scheme with
non-negligible advantage.
 Setup: The challenger  runs this algorithm. It gives the
public parameters PK to the adversary and keeps MK
to itself.
 Phase 1: issues queries for the private keys
corresponding to the sets of attributes 11,... qS S . In
addition, he also submits an access structure AS*. If any
of the sets satisfies the access structure AS*, then aborts.
generates the corresponding secret keys SKs to the sets
for .
 Challenge:submits two equal length messages M0 and
M1 to . The challenger  randomly flips a coin b, and
encrypts Mb under the challenge access structure AS*.
Then the generated ciphertext blocks CTBs will be given
to .
 Phase 2:issues queries for the private keys as in Phase
1, and the sets are turned from
11
,... qS S to 1 1,...q qS S .
 Guess: The adversary outputs its guess ' {0,1}b  for b
and wins the game if 'b b .
Obviously, the game is formulated corresponding to the one
in [12]. Thus, if  can attack our scheme with non-negligible
advantage, he can attack the CP-ABE [12] as well.
B. Partition
A complete tree will be partitioned into several sub-trees,
and each data block (DB) will be encrypted with the CP-ABE.
The difference is that each sub-tree only contains two levels:
one root node and its child nodes. In case some ciphertext
blocks are not decrypted, we propose two ways for decryption:
one is the same as CP-ABE, the other one is to compute the
root node value of current sub-tree from its parent block.
However, it may lead to the consequence that even if the user’s
set doesn’t satisfy the access policy, the user can still perform
decryption and obtain some DBs.
Theorem 2: Partition doesn’t impact the security of our
scheme.
Proof: Compared with a complete tree, each level contains
partial access policy. There is no other information inserted
into these partitioned ones.
As for DBs, all of them are preprocessed for the first one.
Without the first one, even all the rests are acquired, none of
9them can be retrieved. The only way to access the first DB is to
satisfy its access policy, which is the same as that of [12]. Thus,
the partition of the message and the tree doesn’t impact the
security of the proposed scheme.
C. Privacy-Preserving and Integrity
Theorem 3: Our scheme is secure against the adversaries
with polynomial time in the length of the access tree
information.
Proof: To protect the access tree information, we encrypt it
with (n+1, n+1) threshold secret sharing scheme, that is, the
secret will be shared among n+1 parties. Before encryption,
each ciphertext block obtains a randomly generated string as
its id. These strings are the n shares of the secret. The n+1-th
share is implicit, encrypted with another (k, t) threshold secret
sharing scheme.
Only with n valid ciphertext blocks and the recovered
n+1-th share, can the secret be retrieved. However, the strings
of attributes are assigned to legal users by the trusted AA.
Adversaries who have no knowledge about the attribute strings
cannot launch the brute force attack to guess the attribute
strings within polynomial time. Thus, they cannot detect the
underlying information about the secret without attributes.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Numerical analysis
In this paper, we partition a large file into several data
blocks, which can be encrypted, decrypted, and transmitted
concurrently. Therefore, we are able to perform the
encryption/decryption and the transmission of different blocks
in parallel. Now, we give the efficiency analysis according to
the process shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. The time cost in each
step is shown in Table II.
TABLE II. THE PARAMETERS IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Symbols Description
n Number of blocks M is partitioned into.
ETM Encryption time of the whole file
ETi Encryption time of data block i.
TTM Transmission Encryption time of the whole file
TTi Transmission time of data block i.
DTM Decryption time of the whole file.
DTi Decryption time of data block i.
1) Encryption-Transmission
The total time of traditional scheme [12] is,
M MET TT 
If i iTT ET , the total time of our scheme is,
1 1i MET TT ET TT   
Else, the total time is,
n i M nTT ET ET TT   
We set T to denote the difference:
1 1M M M M
M M M n M n
T ET TT ET TT ET ET
T ET TT ET TT TT TT
      
       
For all various data we suppose that there is no delay in the
process of block encryption/decryption or transmission.
Therefore, there is no time gap between two consecutive
blocks in data block encryption, decryption, and transmission.
Thus, in either case, 0T  .
2) Transmission-Decryption
The total time of traditional scheme [12] is,
M MTT DT 
If i iTT ET , the total time of our scheme is,
i n M nTT DT TT DT   
Else, the total time is,
1 1i MTT DT DT TT   
We set T denote the difference:
1 1
M M n M M n
M M M M
T DT TT DT TT DT DT
T DT TT DT TT TT TT
      
       
Ideally, 1,  M n MDT DT TT TT  .
Thus, in either case, 0T  .
B. Experimental results
To evaluate the performance of our system, we
implemented a testing environment using the cpabe-toolkit
[38].
While most of the computation cost in encryption is due to
the access tree, generating polynomials only takes a small
portion of the time. We partition the data into blocks so that the
encryption and transmission of data blocks can be executed
simultaneously. In the comparative test, the different sizes of
the text are first encrypted with the same access tree that
contains ten levels and a hundred leaf nodes. As different
decryption keys can affect the decryption time overhead, we
use the same key to conduct the experiment Compared with
[12], Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b) show the difference of time cost
between reference [12] and our scheme during
encryption/decryption and transmission.
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Fig.4 (a) Comparison of the encryption and transmission time between
CP-ABE and our scheme, when the message size rises.
Encryption and transmission can be concurrently performed
in data blocks. Compared to [12], the total time of encryption
and transmission has been reduced.
Fig. 4 (b) Comparison of the transmission and decryption time between
CPABE and our system, when the number of blocks is different.
Similar to the encryption operation, the transmission and
decryption are, also concurrently performed in data blocks.
Compared to [12], the total time of decryption and
transmission has been reduced.
Next, let the access trees share the same number of interior
nodes (i.e., the number of blocks is fixed) but have different
numbers of leaf nodes. Fig. 4 (c) shows the difference of time
cost between reference [12] and our scheme during encryption.
The total time of [12] rises as the number of leaf nodes grows.
Although it increases as well in our scheme, the rate is very
small and the time is significantly reduced, shown in Fig. 4 (c).
Fig. 4 (c) Comparison of the encryption and transmission time between
CP-ABE and our scheme, when the total number of leaves nodes grows.
Finally, with a fixed number of the leaf nodes, the results in
Fig. 4 (d) indicate that the total time of our scheme drops
slightly as the number of blocks grows.
Fig. 4 (d) Comparison of the encryption and transmission time between
CP-ABE and our scheme, when the number of blocks grows.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cloud-IoT techniques are widely deployed in Smart Grid.
Huge amount of data is gathered by IoT front-end devices and
stored in the back-end cloud servers. However, achieving data
security and system efficiency in the data acquisition and
transmission process are of great significance and challenging.
Existing related schemes cannot deal with this challenging
issue well. To tackle with this problem, we propose a secure
and efficient data acquisition scheme for Cloud-IoT in smart
grid. In the proposed scheme, the large data is partitioned into
several blocks, and the blocks are encrypted/decrypted and
transmitted in sequence. In addition, we adopt the dual secret
sharing scheme, which realizes the privacy-preserving, the
data integrity check and the attributes check simultaneously.
The analysis shows that the proposed scheme can meet the
security requirements of data acquisition in smart grid, and it
11
also reduces response time overhead significantly compared to
other popular schemes. The data of the proposed scheme is not
uploaded in real time, it is offline before encryption. The
research on data timeliness will be our future work.
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